Religion-and-Science
My dissertation analyzes various methods, or modes of argumentation, public-facing scholars of religion-and-science employ to justify particular characterizations of the relationship between religion and science, and considers whether such methods are proportionate to the actual concerns of those publics the scholars take themselves to address. In particular, I examine a range of methods which might be grouped under the headings ``historical," ``philosophical," and ``social scientific"---not because they are limited to the disciplines with which those adjectives are associated but simply because it is in those disciplines where such methods are most commonly found. These methods, I claim, dominate the religion-and-science literature but are often incompatible with one another---a fact not widely recognized. Furthermore, particular members of the public will find the different methods more or less convincing based on the particular values they embrace/reason they enter the religion-and-science literature in the first place. In getting a clearer picture of the methods scholars use and the public values with which they align, I aim to offer insight into why particular forms of scholarship receive wider public uptake as well as guidance to public consumers of the quite massive religion-and-science literature.
The Aims of Typologies and A Typology of Methods --- in this paper I provide a general analysis of typologies in the field of religion-and-science and then provide a new kind of typology, one based on the methods used by scholars in their attempts at characterizing the relationship between religion and science. Along the way, I distinguish two different kinds of typologies already existing in the literature, identify two main uses to which those typologies are put, and discuss three virtues we might desire typologies to have: ability to highlight effective engagement between pieces of scholarship, explain why some scholarly works receive more public uptake, and provide a guide to the literature for various publics.
Paper available in Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science.
The Method of Conceptual Analysis in Religion-and-Science--- in this paper I critique the use of conceptual analysis in attempts to characterize the relationship between religion and science. Conceptual analysis begins by defining the terms `religion' and `science,' and then attempts to deduce (logically) their relation on the basis of those definitions. While some have called on scholars to abandon this method, seeing it hopelessly mired in issues related to oversimplification and over-essentializing, I argue that conceptual analysis, while problematic in many of its current instantiations, can be responsibly and usefully employed as a tool for characterizing the religion-science relationship.
Paper forthcoming in Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science; draft available upon request
New Religious Movements and Science: What Now, What Next, Where To?--- in this overview (co-authored with Stefano Bigliardi), we review recent work on the emerging field of New Religious Movements and science, focusing on Bigliardi's Cambridge Element on the topic. The paper critically analyzes Bigliardi's methodology and conclusions and provides suggestions for how scholarship in the area may be fruitfully extended and deepened.
Paper under review
HOPOS
I am working (on and off) on a paper looking at the debate over the use of hypotheses in 18th century science. In particular, I look at Emilie DuChatelet and George-Louis LeSage's support of hypotheses and contrast their understanding of just what a hypothesis is with that of their far more numerous opponents (e.g. Newton). I argue that really the debate over hypotheses was not a debate over the methodology of science but rather over the aims of science. Supporters of hypotheses believed science aimed at providing (efficient) causal explanations, while anti-hypothesizers explicitly disavowed such explanations and instead embraced more descriptive aims.
Draft available upon request
My dissertation analyzes various methods, or modes of argumentation, public-facing scholars of religion-and-science employ to justify particular characterizations of the relationship between religion and science, and considers whether such methods are proportionate to the actual concerns of those publics the scholars take themselves to address. In particular, I examine a range of methods which might be grouped under the headings ``historical," ``philosophical," and ``social scientific"---not because they are limited to the disciplines with which those adjectives are associated but simply because it is in those disciplines where such methods are most commonly found. These methods, I claim, dominate the religion-and-science literature but are often incompatible with one another---a fact not widely recognized. Furthermore, particular members of the public will find the different methods more or less convincing based on the particular values they embrace/reason they enter the religion-and-science literature in the first place. In getting a clearer picture of the methods scholars use and the public values with which they align, I aim to offer insight into why particular forms of scholarship receive wider public uptake as well as guidance to public consumers of the quite massive religion-and-science literature.
The Aims of Typologies and A Typology of Methods --- in this paper I provide a general analysis of typologies in the field of religion-and-science and then provide a new kind of typology, one based on the methods used by scholars in their attempts at characterizing the relationship between religion and science. Along the way, I distinguish two different kinds of typologies already existing in the literature, identify two main uses to which those typologies are put, and discuss three virtues we might desire typologies to have: ability to highlight effective engagement between pieces of scholarship, explain why some scholarly works receive more public uptake, and provide a guide to the literature for various publics.
Paper available in Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science.
The Method of Conceptual Analysis in Religion-and-Science--- in this paper I critique the use of conceptual analysis in attempts to characterize the relationship between religion and science. Conceptual analysis begins by defining the terms `religion' and `science,' and then attempts to deduce (logically) their relation on the basis of those definitions. While some have called on scholars to abandon this method, seeing it hopelessly mired in issues related to oversimplification and over-essentializing, I argue that conceptual analysis, while problematic in many of its current instantiations, can be responsibly and usefully employed as a tool for characterizing the religion-science relationship.
Paper forthcoming in Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science; draft available upon request
New Religious Movements and Science: What Now, What Next, Where To?--- in this overview (co-authored with Stefano Bigliardi), we review recent work on the emerging field of New Religious Movements and science, focusing on Bigliardi's Cambridge Element on the topic. The paper critically analyzes Bigliardi's methodology and conclusions and provides suggestions for how scholarship in the area may be fruitfully extended and deepened.
Paper under review
HOPOS
I am working (on and off) on a paper looking at the debate over the use of hypotheses in 18th century science. In particular, I look at Emilie DuChatelet and George-Louis LeSage's support of hypotheses and contrast their understanding of just what a hypothesis is with that of their far more numerous opponents (e.g. Newton). I argue that really the debate over hypotheses was not a debate over the methodology of science but rather over the aims of science. Supporters of hypotheses believed science aimed at providing (efficient) causal explanations, while anti-hypothesizers explicitly disavowed such explanations and instead embraced more descriptive aims.
Draft available upon request
